The Lord Bishop of Worcester: My Lords, does the Minister agree that in her own and the Government's strong commitment to reducing re-offending and to rehabilitation, the existence of a report produced by a highly competent and astute observer who is also in a highly prestigious public office is a great asset and support? Will the Minister therefore reconsider any policies that might lead to the reduction of the effectiveness and public prestige of Anne Owers's office?

Lord Dholakia: My Lords, one area of concern expressed by HMI is the very high prison population, which is now at a record level. The other area explained by HMI is the inadequacy of resources and provision for young adults, who so prominently feature in figures on re-offending. Can the Minister indicate when the prison population is likely to drop, so that such issues can be adequately addressed, particularly in relation to the rehabilitation of young adults?

Baroness Scotland of Asthal: My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord for his question. Of course, we are not at the highest level; we are at just over 77,000. I agree with the noble Lord that that is a high number, but the whole thrust of our policy is to get better risk assessments, identifying who needs to be in prison for how long and making sure that that is a positive and creative opportunity to reduce re-offending. All the work that we are doing to reduce re-offending is to that end. If we reduce re-offending, we shall reduce the prison population.

Baroness Howe of Idlicote: My Lords, given that it is the Government's view that the link between poor educational experience, unemployment and re-offending is striking, should not responsibility for this important area be represented in all prisons at the highest senior management level?

Baroness Northover: asked Her Majesty's Government:
	What representations they will make to the government of Israel concerning the deaths of Tom Hurndall and James Miller following the verdicts by St Pancras Coroner's Court on 10 and 6 April respectively.

Baroness Williams of Crosby: My Lords, I am afraid that the matter goes a little further than that. First, the Minister will be aware that the family felt that it got very little support and help from the Foreign Office during the extremely difficult past two years. Secondly, he will be aware that, during the recent inquests into the cases of Mr James Miller and Mr Tom Hurndall, there was virtually no co-operation by the Israeli Government. That seems a tragedy, given that the cases raise extremely serious issues about rules of engagement, the extent to which they are maintained by the relevant government and the obvious suffering of families whose sons were completely innocent of an aggression or offence of any kind. Will the noble Lord consider carefully what the Foreign Office can do in these cases? Also, taking into account the Attorney-General's great commitment to the rule of law internationally and nationally, what steps might be taken—particularly the rules of engagement under which they occurred—to ensure that they are carefully reviewed by the Government of Israel?

Lord Crickhowell: Amendments Nos. 1 and 3 are probing amendments. This is a Bill that starts by declaring that there is "to be" an Assembly when there already is an Assembly. In due course, we will come to clauses that establish what happens to that existing Assembly. It is reasonable to ask, however, why the Bill is drafted in this way. As this is in part a consolidation measure and in part new legislation, it may be argued that it is tidier and simpler to proceed in this way. However, there is a danger: this is a big Bill. There are some easily identified clauses that we can all recognise as important. But there is a risk that we will miss or fail to detect other clauses that make changes which may be very important.
	It is also a fact that as events have moved on since the Bill was drafted revision of some clauses may be required. We already have government Amendments Nos. 5 and 6, for example, which do just that. It is very desirable that the Minister should clearly identify, clause by clause, and as we proceed, where the drafting simply replicates existing legislation and where changes are being made and for what reason. My amendment provides an opportunity to make some general points that have not been addressed at Second Reading. I made my general position very clear during the Second Reading debate. I do not think that we should go back to the structures in place before the referendum. I think that our job is to attempt to make the post-referendum Assembly Government more effective, in so far as we can do that, by building on the experience of the existing Assembly, and so long as we do not go beyond the authority granted by the Welsh people in that referendum.
	The previous legislation, in my judgment, went too far in seeking to impose procedures on the Assembly that would have been much better decided by the Assembly itself. If we are to have an Assembly with wide powers, surely it should be allowed to decide its own procedures in the light of its own experience. Parliament should limit itself to imposing procedures that are required to ensure constitutional propriety and to prevent it acting beyond the powers that have been granted to it by Parliament, but should not attempt to impose other matters on the Assembly. The Bill removes, or relaxes, some of the procedural restrictions, but we will need to consider whether the Government have got the balance right, and in particular whether the role given to the Secretary of State is appropriate. There are some Liberal Democrat amendments that raise that issue with which I have some sympathy.
	The report of the Constitution Select Committee of this House comments on that subject in paragraph 18 on page 10, when it points out that Clause 29 requires the Standing Orders of the Assembly to make specific provision on the party political composition of committees. It tells us that there is no comparable provision in the Scotland Act 1998 in relation to committees of the Scottish Parliament. It concludes:
	"It may be thought that clause 29 is an inappropriate incursion into matters that should be left for the Assembly to determine for itself".
	That is exactly the kind of interference that I have sought to identify, and we should look to see whether there are other cases.
	The performance of the existing Assembly has been mixed. Much of what it does is, I fear, barely recognised by the people of Wales. That may be the fault of the media, which is not exactly comprehensive in its coverage of the Assembly's activities. It is probably better known for what it has got wrong than for its achievements. One Assembly Member has told me that at least in part that is due to weaknesses in the present structure and the procedural limitations to which I have already referred. Clearly, the situation will be considerably helped by the separation of the Executive role from the legislative and scrutiny functions. That is a change that I warmly welcomed at Second Reading.
	There is an important need for arrangements that make clear where responsibility lies, but that does not mean that it will always be wise to take within the responsibility of the Assembly all the functions for which it is responsible. Even if their nature may change, there will still be a useful role for quangos and for the contribution of individuals with wide experience who are prepared to offer their skills in public service. Time alone will tell whether it has been wise, for example, to absorb within the Assembly the work of the Welsh Development Agency and the Welsh Language Board. I have my doubts about that, particularly in the case of the Welsh Language Board.
	There is a need for arrangements that enable Assembly Members to challenge, and if necessary bring to heel, Members of the Executive. That has been amply proved by the extraordinary conduct of Mr Pugh, whose treatment of Geraint Talfan Davies—whose contribution to and knowledge of Welsh culture and the arts far exceeds his own—has in my judgment been disgraceful. The manner in which he has dealt with the Arts Council of Wales and arts funding has caused well-justified and widespread anger and concern. I cite that simply as an example of where there is a need for independent and separate judgment by Assembly Members of the actions of the Executive.
	The changes that we make to the Bill may not prevent in the future ministerial folly or incompetence. But as we move from one form of assembly to another, we can ensure that the lines of responsibility are clear; and that the elected Members of the Assembly are in a position to prevent abuse and to keep the people of Wales fully informed about the way in which Government are being conducted in Wales.
	On Amendment No. 2—it will be moved shortly from the Liberal Democrat Benches—the proposition having been debated in a committee of the Assembly, it was rejected by seven votes to one with two abstentions. If we are to take the Assembly seriously, perhaps we should take its advice on this matter. I beg to move.

Lord Elystan-Morgan: On the amendment dealing with whether we use the word "parliament" or "senedd" to describe the present Assembly, I consider this a matter of considerable principle. Members of the Committee may ask, "What is in a name?". As Shakespeare put it,
	"A rose by any other name would smell as sweet".
	But not when one is dealing with parliamentary draftsmanship and not when names are symbolic of the hopes and aspirations of a whole community. That is, essentially, what the amendment is about.
	I shall make my submissions briefly. First, there is a very solid precedent for the use of the word "senedd", at least in its English form. In the legislation of 1978, which preceded the referendum of 1979—the Committee will remember that the Act of Parliament set up the very structure of that institution but it was up to the Welsh people to accept it or not and in the event they did not—the term used for the body was not "assembly" or "parliament", but "senate". Therefore, one should always remember that there is that solid and respectable precedent to be built upon.
	Secondly, I do not believe there is anything pejorative in the use of the word "senate". Some people in Wales have argued that it has indeed an unfortunate connotation, coming from the Latin senex, meaning an old man and, therefore, that it depicts a body of senile people. I am quite sure that the average age of Members in the Welsh Assembly at present is somewhat younger than that of both Houses at Westminster.
	We also have the precedent of the Scotland Act 1998. The Scots achieved a parliament. As the jurisdiction, particularly the legislative jurisdiction, of the Welsh body was not exactly on a par with Scotland, it might be argued that that distinction should be drawn. But we are now dealing with a Bill that closes that gap considerably. Part 3 of the Bill will enable substantial legislative decisions to be made on a fairly regular basis. Part 4 will create a full-blown legislature. It will be up to the Welsh people whether or not they opt for it, but that option will be there. That enabling legislation will be a fact and a reality if this Bill passes.
	Furthermore, there have been, as Members of this House are well aware, very many home rule Bills over the past century or so—I think they go back to about 1880. In each case, as far as I know, there was a reference, not to an assembly, but to a parliament. Therefore, bearing in mind that in 1978 a body that did not have half the authority held by the present body was called a senate, it would be retrograde and strange to adhere to the term "assembly".
	I heard, with great respect, the contribution of the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Swansea. However, the short point is that there is no such term of art in the nomenclature "assembly" as to tie this House to any particular form of constitution. It is a general term. Again, it seems that if we adopt this amendment—I doubt whether the Government will be so completely accommodating—it would not do more than show respect for the hopes and aspirations now generally held by a majority in Wales as to a form of government that would be worthy of the Welsh nation.

Lord Roberts of Conwy: I am sure that we are all grateful to my noble friend Lord Crickhowell for opening in his usual poignant and effective style the first Committee debate of the Bill and for highlighting the simple fact that we already have a National Assembly for Wales, and have done so since the Government of Wales Act 1998. Section 1 of that Act states:
	"There shall be an Assembly for Wales to be known as the National Assembly for Wales or Cynulliad Cenedlaethol Cymru".
	Those words of translation were carefully chosen and debated at that time. We should be careful before making an abrupt change. We must be sure that it would be acceptable to the Welsh people. Let us not forget that "Senedd" is the word normally used in Welsh to describe this Parliament of Westminster, which is somewhat different from "Cynulliad Cenedlaethol Cymru". The next subsections of Section 1 of the Government of Wales Act 1998 state:
	"The Assembly shall be a body corporate",
	and that the,
	"exercise by the Assembly of its functions is to be regarded as done on behalf of the Crown".
	When one compares the content of that section with the content of the first clause of this Bill—and, indeed, the remainder—one begins to realise the extent of the change envisaged in the new Bill. The new Assembly is not a later model; it is a new creation. It is not, as a whole, a body corporate—that status is confined to the Assembly Commission. As for its functions, the majority are to be transferred to Ministers in the Assembly government.
	Some might say that the Ministers, rather than the Assembly, are the real gainers under this Bill. As the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee has noted, in paragraph 11 of its seventeenth report:
	"The principle of this bill is that powers to make delegated legislation should in future be conferred on Welsh Ministers, the First Minister or the Counsel General (who is not required to be a member of the NAW)".
	The transfer of functions to Ministers, in the process of separating the executive and legislative arms of the Assembly under the 1998 Act, is extensive and goes beyond the provisions of Part 2 of this Bill, to Part 6 and the transitional provisions in Clause 161 and Schedule 11. The Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee states in paragraph 45 of its report that,
	"it is Schedule 11, not an order under clause 58, that gives NAW's existing functions of making subordinate legislation to Welsh Ministers".
	So there is a subtraction of power from the Assembly proper and an accretion of power to Ministers, as I read the Bill and, I think I am right in saying, as the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee reads it. The committee considered that,
	"the transitional provisions are more significant than in most other bills and that the affirmative procedure should apply to orders which modify Schedule 11".
	I hope that we will remember that point when we come to that part of the Bill.
	The National Assembly of the 1998 Act, which was modelled on local authorities, has not been an outstanding success in all respects, as the strong wish to change it expressed by the Assembly itself in 2002 clearly indicates. The Government's endorsement of the present Bill, based on the White Paper Better Governance for Wales, points to the same conclusion. The inescapable fact is that the present system does not appear to command the support of the majority of the people it serves. Even the most optimistic interpretation of opinion polls does not assert that with any degree of conviction.
	The Bill represents a fresh start, which is conveyed in the first clause. The key question is whether it is the right start. The Secretary of State, Mr Peter Hain, said in the other place as recently as 28 February that:
	"I have no doubt that if a referendum were held today, it would be lost".—[Official Report, Commons, 28/2/06; col. 209.]
	That view hardly shows confidence in the rectitude of the old Bill or of the present one, but quite the reverse. However, at this stage, our task as an official Opposition is not to outline an alternative or to indicate a preference for one of those already presented, but to be constructively critical of the Government's proposals. That will, I hope, describe our conduct in Committee.

Lord Roberts of Llandudno: I welcomed the words of the noble Lord, Lord Elystan-Morgan, who quoted something that I was going to quote: Shakespeare's words "a rose by any other name". I suggest that a daffodil by any other name would look just as beautiful. Of course, this is not the same daffodil or the same rose. As the noble Lord, Lord Roberts of Conwy, said, the Bill is a new start. It is a new opportunity. The Government often say that they fulfilled their pledges to Wales and Scotland and gave them the devolution of power that they asked for and voted for some years ago. This would be a great opportunity for the Government to take pride in a new title. They would be able to say in future elections that they gave Wales the "Senedd", the Senate. That would be a new step forward. I would like to say this in Welsh, but is not the manner of House for me to do so. But what a chance for the Government to say that they gave Wales a Senate that reflected the new role and the moving forward of devolution in Wales.
	As has been mentioned by my noble friend Lord Livsey, the building in Cardiff has the name "Senedd" on it. Surely it is appropriate that the body that meets within that building should also be the "Senedd". I suggest to the Government that this is an opportunity to say that this is another landmark for which they are responsible. I am sure that most Members of this House would welcome a change of title from Cynulliad—assembly. There are school assemblies, the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland and many others are assemblies, but the new body in Wales will have legislative powers, which will develop as the years go on. The Government would find it so easy, this time, to mark this development by accepting this amendment and the term "Senedd" or Senate.

Lord Evans of Temple Guiting: The past 27 minutes have shown what an interesting Committee stage we will have on the Bill. I hope I can say that we have not been addressing the three amendments, which noble Lords have used to introduce general views on the Bill. I say that because I hope I will be excused for responding very specifically to these three amendments and not to some of the arguments and points made on Second Reading.
	Amendments Nos. 1 and 3, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Crickhowell, seek to modify the description of the Assembly in Clause 1 and to redefine it as an institution that already exists. This could be perceived as true, but the provisions in the Bill redefine the term "Assembly" by splitting the legislature from the Executive, as we have heard. Both sides of the House have welcomed that. The noble Lord, Lord Crickhowell, welcomed it on Second Reading, and reemphasised that point today. As a result of the clause, the Assembly will no longer be a corporate body consisting of a legislature and an executive arm as provided for in the Government of Wales Act 1998; it will be an unincorporated association of its elected members, much as the House of Commons is. Technically, therefore, it is new. The noble Lord, Lord Crickhowell, said that that the two amendments were probing, and I hope he will not press them after my explanation.
	Amendment No. 2, in the names of the noble Lords, Lord Livsey of Talgarth, Lord Thomas of Gresford and Lord Roberts of Llandudno, is, as we know, identical to the one tabled in Committee in another place. It would rename the Assembly the "Senedd". Since 1999, the National Assembly for Wales has become an established feature of public life in Wales. As we saw from the recent ICM poll, public recognition of and support for the Assembly has increased as time has passed. In the Government's view, it does not make sense to change the name of an institution that has become established in the public consciousness, but I resist with some difficulty the extremely eloquent arguments of the noble Lords, Lord Roberts of Llandudno and Lord Elystan-Morgan.
	The term "National Assembly" is used for legislatures across the world. Four EU member states have parliaments or lower houses that bear the title "National Assembly" in their respective languages. In total, it is used by 62 countries around the world, so Wales is in good company. It is our firmly held view that to change these terms now would risk further confusion even as we try to make things clearer and more transparent. I have explained the Government's position. I do not expect noble Lords who have spoken to the amendments with such passion to accept what I have said, but I hope that they will not press them.

Lord Elystan-Morgan: I make a rather obvious point. If the decision is to be that of the Assembly, and to regard it as having a sovereign morality in the matter, does the noble Lord accept that if the Assembly took a different view, it would be perfectly legitimate, presumably under Part 3, for that change of name to be brought about by the Assembly?

Lord Crickhowell: When we come to Part 3, we will discover that clause after clause was debated by the Assembly and that all the parties voted in one way and the Government voted in the opposite direction. There were tied votes and the presiding officer had to act as presiding officers do—as the Lord Chancellor does in this House and as the Speaker does in the other place—and vote for the status quo. So I am not sure that the noble Lord will be on entirely strong ground when we reach later parts of the Bill. All I want to say at the moment is that I entirely agree that the Government were right to reject Amendment No. 3. I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

Lord Thomas of Gresford: This amendment was grouped with Amendments Nos. 1 and 3. As it covers a different subject, I seek to move it for the purpose of replying to the Minister. Obviously, I do not expect him to respond. I think that this is in accordance with proper procedure. The noble Lord, Lord Crickhowell, was on his feet very quickly to respond to Amendment No. 1 and he withdrew it before I had any opportunity of intervening.
	Therefore, perhaps I may I direct the Committee again to Amendment No. 2. The essential thing that this Bill does is entirely to change the structure of the National Assembly for Wales. It has already been pointed out that the Assembly was fashioned as a corporate body, taking corporate responsibility for its activities. The Bill now happily moves on to a structure where the powers are handed over to Ministers and there is an executive and a Parliament of the sort we know. As the Assembly will be of an entirely different status from the way in which it was set up, it seems to me very appropriate that we should take the opportunity to change the name. Further, if Part 4 comes into operation at some future time, it will be as much a legislature passing primary legislation as any other assembly or gathering of politicians anywhere in the world.
	The noble Lord, Lord Anderson, objected to the fact that the word "Senedd" is used. Bilingualism is in the amendment because it states that there shall be,
	"a Parliament for Wales to be known as the 'Senedd'".
	That that word has some meaning and some significance is reflected, as noble Lords have said, by the fact that the building is now called the Senedd.
	I invite your Lordships to consider that there will really be no difference between the devolved body in Wales and the devolved body in Scotland once this Bill comes into operation. Through use of the "Assembly Measures" that are set out in the Bill, Members of the Assembly will be able to exercise primary legislative powers. The Assembly will operate on the same basis as the Scottish Parliament. I see no reason why its proper designation should not be given. The noble Lord, Lord Elystan-Morgan, said that the Bill must be forward looking and that we must not look back to the past. We have seen devolution take place in Wales in three stages. We saw, first of all, the Welsh Office being set up as a purely administrative body. We then moved to the corporate model. We are now moving to what is known throughout the world as a parliament. If it is an established feature of Welsh life, as the Minister described it, let us call it by its proper name and give it its proper dignity.

Lord Livsey of Talgarth: The amendment proposes that election in multi-member constituencies should take place by the single transferable vote and that the Senedd should consist of 80 members to bring that about. It would replace Clause 1(2). As far as support for the amendment is concerned, I refer the Committee to the Richard report, whose conclusions on this issue are very straightforward and easily understood.
	Paragraph 47 of chapter 14 of the report states:
	"If AMS [additional member system] is to be replaced, the best option for electing an 80 Member Assembly is the STV [single transferable vote] system. This would not necessarily produce a more proportional outcome than AMS - it might not, depending on the size of the constituency (Chapter 12). The case for adopting the STV system would be to maintain the principle of proportionality while ensuring that all Members were elected in the same way, and enjoyed the same relationship with the electorate".
	As regards this amendment, that is very straightforward.
	I shall also refer to other amendments in this group which are put forward in our name. Amendment No. 7 refers specifically to multi-member constituencies, which is a concomitant of creating the STV system, and Amendment No. 14 refers to single transferable vote constituencies. Constructing a system via these amendments would give each Member of the Assembly equal validity in terms of the voting system. It would create what we believe to be a fairer Assembly. Amendment No. 21 refers again to single transferable vote elections. Amendment No. 24 refers to the lowering of the voting age to 16. This is a comprehensive group of amendments put forward in our name, which we believe to be worthy of consideration by the Committee.

Lord Roberts of Conwy: I have listened carefully to what the noble Lord has said in favour of this amendment and the substitution of the single transferable vote system, as described by the Richard commission report. However, the amendment generates a number of concerns. Changing the number of elected representatives and the voting system would be a huge adjustment for the Welsh Assembly. Furthermore, accepting this amendment would mean introducing the system without any serious consultation or debate. I am very antipathetic towards that.
	It is essential that before any new system is considered there should be extensive consultation about whether the people of Wales see the single transferable vote as a suitable replacement to the current additional member system, which we will come to shortly. STV is also damaging to important constituency links between Member and voter and impacts on the democratic accountability that those links enable. Much larger constituencies with more Members will fundamentally reduce the link between an MP and his or her constituency. Accepting this amendment would lead to a fundamental change to the voting system in Wales. We cannot support an amendment which calls for such a change without prior consultation with those that it affects. I am therefore of the opinion that we should maintain the current additional member system, as I shall argue shortly, which enables us to include the best features of the first-past-the-post system while including proportionality between parties through party list voting.

Lord Richard: Since my report has been mentioned, perhaps I may explain why we came to our conclusions. Briefly, this was a severely practical argument that resulted in what I hope was a severely practical conclusion. We looked at the work the Assembly would be called upon to do and concluded that 60 Members would be insufficient. If one takes away from the total the number who would be Ministers, one is in a situation in which it is barely possible to man the committee system which the Assembly has operated for some time with the remaining Members.
	If the Assembly is too small in terms of manpower, one has to ask this question: if you increase the number of Members, can the electoral system be left exactly as it is? Again, we came to the conclusion that 80 Members would be the right number. There is nothing magic about the figure; it is a sensible number to recommend for an assembly with the additional powers that we had recommended for it. I agree with the remarks made by the noble Lord, Lord Livsey, that the Assembly is now going to have some legislative powers and therefore the burden being placed on it by this Bill is not all that different from the burden that would have been placed on it if the recommendations of my commission had been accepted in their entirety.
	From there, we asked how to get 80 Members elected to the Assembly. During the course of the commission we heard a fair amount of evidence to suggest that there were difficulties between the Assembly Members elected for the constituencies and those who were on the list. The Committee will forgive me if I do not go into the detail of what those difficulties might be, but there is no doubt that 40 directly elected Members and 20 from the list system has created certain inner tensions, which it was difficult to see how to resolve by increasing the number of list Members. If there are problems with a 40:20 division, the problems with a 40:40 split would be infinitely greater.
	We then came to the following conclusion as the result of what I hope was a fairly logical sequence: if the Assembly is to be given more powers and 60 Members would make it too small and 80 is the right number; if you cannot have a system of 40 elected and 40 list members, what should you have? I have to say that when the commission started out on this exercise, I was not an unquestioning adherent to the single transferable vote. But I am also bound to say that once we had looked at all the alternative systems of proportional representation—we accepted that there had to be an element of proportionality built into it, otherwise we would end up with one-party domination of the Assembly which even those on my side would agree might not be entirely appropriate—we had to ask which system should be adopted. We looked at all the different systems of proportional representation in order to achieve a system in which, first, every AM would have equal validity and, secondly, there would be broad proportionality across the Assembly in order to reflect in broad proportion the views of the people of Wales. However, with the best will in the world, we could not come up with a different or better system. A system with a number of constituencies grouped together so that the operation of the single transferable vote could take place would result in an Assembly that was broadly proportional and large enough to do the job the commission wanted to place upon it.
	If the Bill goes through in its present form, we will be placing burdens on an Assembly of 60 Members which personally I doubt whether they will be able to fulfil. By all means let them try—I can see the argument which says, "Very well. We think we can do it with 60 Members". If that is the message sent by the Assembly, it is not for this House to stand in its way, saying: "If you think you can do it with 60 Members, try it with that number". However, I have no doubt whatever what the eventual result will be: the Assembly will not be able to function properly with a membership as low as 60, and there will then be pressure to increase the number. If that is so, we will have exactly the same electoral difficulties as the ones my commission tried to face.

Lord Anderson of Swansea: It has been valuable to hear the reasons given by the noble Lord, Lord Richard, why he, personally, and a number of the members of his commission began as sceptics about STV but were forced by practical rather than ideological considerations to a certain conclusion. The initial reasons for AMS were essentially practical: to have as little change as possible. The number 40 came from the existing constituencies in Wales at that time, and there were the five European constituencies. As they were existing, known constituencies, it made sense to have 20—five times four—additional Members. It is also fair to say that the additional-member system has not worked particularly well. There is certainly a feeling among some that the list Members are perhaps less legitimate than the others, although that is probably misplaced and there are also complaints about the way in which they operate. We rehearsed some of those arguments on Second Reading.
	The arguments are finely balanced. Ultimately the question of increasing the numbers of the Assembly Members from 60 to 80 will have to be faced because there are complaints from a number of Assembly Members that their workload is already high. This will increase substantially with what is already proposed in the Bill and as one moves further along the path there will be an even greater workload for those who are there. It may be that it is a step too far just at this stage. I remain—and I hope not for nostalgic reasons—committed to the close link between a Member and his constituency. STV by definition means multi-member constituencies with all the problems that one sees accruing to that in other countries where people from the same parties fight each other. It may lead to increasing populism within that.
	There is no ideal system. In its wisdom the Richard Commission came to its own view and I am inclined just on balance to retain the existing system for the moment but with the caveat that ultimately, with an increasing workload and more to come, we will have to face something like STV and perhaps follow the same path as the Richard Commission.

Lord Elystan-Morgan: I have listened intently and with great respect to the words of the noble Lord, Lord Richard, and I, too, am a considerable admirer of what has been achieved in the report and its recommendations. It must be one of the most assiduously considered and imaginatively crafted reports on any constitutional issue for a very long time. One must start from the proposition that although as the noble Lord, Lord Roberts of Conwy, says, it would be a massive change and although it may well be that there is justification for taking the voices of various interests and peoples in Wales on as wide a plane as possible, I nevertheless apprehend that it is an issue that simply will not go away and will have to be considered.
	Remember that of the 22 county councils in Wales all but five have a membership in excess of 60. In other words, if the vast majority of local authorities in Wales can only be properly served in a committee system by a number in excess—and in many cases far in excess—of 60 then clearly the case is made out for a greater number of Members in the Welsh Assembly. But there is also a deeper justification for the amendment and it is that it would remove an essential absurdity, which is that at the previous Assembly elections in 2003 the Labour Party won three times as many seats as all the other parties put together. I appreciate that it had long been determined before that, and that first-past-the-post crudity should be removed from the system and ameliorated by a system of regional Members in addition. Be that as it may, what it means is that a party that has enjoyed power in Wales for more than three-quarters of a century will from time-to-time find itself unable to exercise its powers as a government.
	I will readily confess that when these matters were under consideration in the late 1990s with a view to setting up a Welsh Assembly, I was a judge at the time and was in no position to make any political comment whatever, but I very fondly adhered to the idea that there should be some form of additional member system. I regarded that as being honourable and chivalrous and as avoiding the certainty of a long-term Labour hegemony that might ultimately have a stultifying effect on the Assembly, and thought that it might be the best way out. I was wrong—totally, absolutely and utterly wrong. I confess my guilt and penitence in that regard.
	The ideas behind the additional member system were good and proper, and there was every reason to believe that there would be an inclusive attitude by all the parties concerned. Without in any way suggesting that there is a monopoly of original sin for those minor parties that does not belong to the Labour Party, that was clearly not to be. I have no doubt that had the situation been totally in reverse, the same faults would have appeared. We have a system now whereby, dependent upon illness or some other quirk of fate, there is the possibility from week to week of a vital vote being lost purely on the numbers game, and little to do with merit. That is a situation that cannot be allowed to prevail.
	Likewise, looking back at the system, I think that even if it had not worked out exactly that way, it is a flawed concept of government for there to be two different types of members in the same assembly. The role of the regional members is so undefined—although I have no doubt that in most, if not in all, cases, they are people who work conscientiously and honourably—that it is very difficult for them to work side by side with the first-past-the-post elected member.
	Like the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, many years ago when I was a Member in another place I felt that there was a bond and almost a chastity between the elected Member and his electorate, save for a period of about four or five weeks leading up to an election. But I felt that that chastity was respected, generally; other Members did not come into your constituency, either from your own party or from other parties, save on the basis of notice and understanding and, indeed, of total courtesy. I find it very difficult to imagine how regional members and an individual constituency member can work in a way that is in any way parallel with that principle.
	So the system must be changed—and if it must be changed, I should have thought that STV was as good an alternative as any. I do not think it perfect, because I believe that you break that link that should exist between the electorate and the single member. If you double the membership, of course you do not have a single member any more. My only plea would be that in clustering together the constituencies, one should make that cluster as small as reasonably possible. In other words, if it can be confined to three, four or five members, all the better—but, even then, no single member will be responsible for that constituency.

Lord Norton of Louth: My Lords, I sympathise with the view expressed by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson. I agree with the various points made about the extent to which the existing system is flawed, but there is a danger that we might rush into another system that might demonstrate not dissimilar flaws, and I am slightly worried that the noble Lord, Lord Elystan-Morgan, might be getting to his feet in a few years' time and saying that he was completely wrong about embracing STV.
	We have discussed STV in this Chamber before, so I need not dwell on it but I shall briefly identify some of the problems. If what one wants is a system of proportional representation, as the noble Lord, Lord Richard, pointed out in his report, STV is not the way in which to deliver the most proportional system. In fact, if you want proportionality, the system that comes closest is an additional member system—though not necessarily the one embodied in the Bill, because you need a 50:50 split between constituency and list. However, if one favours proportionality that is the route to go, not the single transferable vote route.
	We should also bear in mind that it is not a system that is widely used. In western Europe only Ireland employs it. There we see some of the problems, not least that to which the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, alluded. That is, if we do away with the present system we replace one form of conflict with another: conflict between list and constituency member with conflict between members within the same multi-constituency area. We see that in Ireland, because there the system has generated a form of localism where the members devote far more time to the constituency than they devote to the Dáil. That is seen as one of the contributory reasons why the Dáil is one of the weakest legislative bodies in western Europe. We must be cautious. I recognise the flaws of the existing system, but there is a danger of saying that something must be done and rushing into STV. We need to be wary of going down that route. I admit that it is easier to say what one is against rather than what one is for, but I want to inject a note of caution before we go down this route.

Baroness Carnegy of Lour: My Lords, I hope that noble Lords will not mind a Scot joining in the debate. The Minister seemed rather to resent Scottish interventions during Second Reading, which was a pity because in this aspect of the amendments on the additional members system there is a cross-over in experience and thinking, which some Welsh noble Lords have already mentioned. I have no personal experience of STV, but we have been discussing where I live in Scotland the effect of STV on the local government elections and how we are going to organise them.
	It has become clear where I live that in the local government context the effect of having a large area with a number of members will be that there will be members from a town far away from where we live about which we know nothing—and in which we are not terribly interested in the context of its purely local affairs—competing with members from round where I live. If they belong to different parties and come from places that are not closely identified there are going to be problems that will have to be overcome. That is what one has to overcome with an STV system.
	But imagining the map of Wales—which, I admit, I do with some difficulty; I do not know it well—I remember from my experience in the Guide Association in Wales that some of the areas are very remote one from another. There will be Assembly members under STV who do not know much about the local area where their constituents are living. Their constituents will have difficulty in identifying with them. I would have thought that the STV system would bring the Assembly further from the people than the present system, not closer. I base that purely on my understanding of the effect of STV in local government in Scotland. I would have thought that that alone is an argument against it.
	In relation to this debate and to the one on the amendment that my noble friend is about to move, it is essential that noble Lords should consider the issue above all from the point of view of the voters and not of the members of the Assembly. Democracy is about what the voters want; it is about giving satisfaction to the voters and trying to get more people to vote. Elected members have to come to terms with the system that they have. That is extremely important. I am sure that they could come to terms with STVs and I am sure that they can come to terms with the system that they have, but we must look primarily at the interests not of elected members but of voters. That is an important point.

Lord Thomas of Gresford: I was rather surprised that the noble Lord, Lord Roberts of Conwy, said that the proposals had had no serious consultation and debate. I prefer the encomium of the noble Lord, Lord Elystan-Morgan, who said that the Richard report was one of the most assiduously considered and imaginative reports there had ever been.
	This issue has been fully discussed and debated throughout Wales and the Richard commission came to a very clear decision. Just as we have looked at the structure of the Assembly and have seen that the proposals are to move on from the corporate structure to one more of ministerial responsibility and an executive, so we ought to consider that the electoral system which was first proposed was transitional. The Government ought not to be afraid of moving from it. The figure of 60 members was chosen because there was a general fear that if you proposed more than 60, the people of Wales would reject the concept altogether because there would be too many paid politicians. Much was made by the opponents of devolution about the fact that we are having more paid politicians and all their staff thrust upon us. That probably restricted the number to 60. Practice has shown, as investigated by the Richard commission, that 60 is not enough, and is certainly not enough with the additional powers that are now being granted to the Assembly.
	In the transitional electoral system that we have a tension has grown up between the constituency members and the regional members. It is a tension that derives from our concept of first past the post which introduces the idea of winners and losers—not of how well represented an area is but that some people have won and other people have lost. There was undoubted resentment—I found that when touring Wales as a member of the Sutherland commission concerned with local government electoral systems—and a great deal of unhappiness expressed by Members of the Labour Party that people who had lost in constituency elections were being returned as Members for a region upon a regional list. I recognise that tension. There has been a suggestion that regional members have less validity than constituency members. Only STV can cure that. The noble Lord, Lord Richard, told us that the commission looked at all sorts of systems. The STV system maintains and retains the connection with a constituency. It means that a member is elected by the electors of that constituency and not on a closed party list, as happens with regional members. I think that everybody in this House, except possibly the Government, would recognise that closed party lists are not a very happy state of affairs. Essentially it would mean that there was no difference between one member and another. There would be equal validity, no question of rank and of, "I represent you better than that regional member over there".
	The AMS system has been tried. It was an experiment. The numbers were an experiment and were transitional. Practice has shown that it is not satisfactory. I urge the Committee to consider that we should change it, and change it now.

Lord Davies of Oldham: We have had an interesting and inevitably wide-ranging debate on electoral systems, which was to be anticipated. First, I make it clear that there is a difference between the argument which my noble friend Lord Richard put forward in his commission, and which he articulated today, and the argument which has been presented by noble Lords from the Liberal Democrat Benches who are keen to advance the excitements of the single transferable vote. I was grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Norton, for pointing out some of the difficulties of the single transferable vote, and also to the noble Lord, Lord Roberts, who indicated his reservations about the virtues of that method. The difference between my noble friend Lord Richard and the Liberal Democrat Party on this is that my noble friend Lord Richard reached the position that there should be 80 Assembly members for Wales, and that the single transferable vote was a way of tackling the election of those increased numbers. The Liberals are going about this the other way round, with the emphasis on the virtues of changing the voting system, and latching on to the report of my noble friend Lord Richard on the 80 Assembly members.
	I will address the serious issue of the extra members. We do not think that there is a great public appetite for additional professional politicians in Wales. I have not heard a single argument this afternoon that has testified to that. We have not had this afternoon any indication of whether in fact the National Assembly for Wales could include its working practices to encompass the additional load, which will certainly be consequent upon this Bill. But significant members in the National Assembly for Wales are well aware of the fact that more work could be done more effectively. I quote no less a figure than the presiding officer, who is a Member of this House also, the noble Lord, Lord Elis-Thomas, who agreed that the timetable could be changed. He indicated, for instance, that the National Assembly for Wales was rising two weeks before the United Kingdom Parliament. At Christmas, he indicated that the assembly could sit for at least 40 weeks, which is pretty close to the regular habits of the United Kingdom Parliament, with this House, I might add, from time to time, outdoing the other place in the numbers of sittings. He agreed that the Assembly could work longer. We all know that assemblies work a great deal longer than the National Assembly for Wales does at the present time.
	I am an admirer of the work that has been achieved so far, but the National Assembly for Wales is in its early days, in terms of how it organises itself and the question of its reputation with the people of Wales. It will want to enhance that reputation and I cannot think of a better way to do this than to address itself to its practices, to how it works, and to be able to organise itself so that work is done more effectively. I think there is considerable agreement among many of the members of the Welsh Assembly. I do not think that an elected member is likely to go before the electorate and say that they were against the additional obligations being put on them by the development of this legislation because it would involve more work. We are not convinced that we need additional numbers. It is only the additional numbers, however, that bring in this argument for the single transferable vote and all its horrors. The noble Lord, Lord Roberts, was his customary courteous and considered self in indicating that he was not totally convinced of the merits of that system. The noble Lord, Lord Norton, indicated just where it falls down in other legislatures.
	Let us try to see what Wales would look like under the single transferable vote. Almost certainly, there would be one constituency for Cardiff, with probably eight members for Cardiff. Well, there is a recipe for effective representation as far as Cardiff is concerned. Of course we would see that all the elected members from different parties, if they were from different parties, would work in amity and concord in the interests of Cardiff, with never a fractious moment between them as they competed for the public's support in Cardiff. Come on, my Lords! That is a recipe for division, not for effective government. It is not even an effective measure for representation, because the problem for the Cardiff electorate would be just who to hold accountable in their substantial constituency.
	It is not as if we have not been down this road before. We know the problems with regard to the elections to the European Parliament and the problems that the British people have with the accountability of those Members. By accountability, I put no other argument forward than the straightforward fact that a very much greater number of the electorate knows who their Member of Parliament is than knows who their MEP is. That would certainly be true with regard to Assembly members if we destroyed the constituency system. It destroys accountability, and the Government are against such a change. I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Carnegy, who also identified her anxieties about the implications for a rural area. Wales is pretty rural too, and a couple of these constituencies would be vast—for example, in northern Wales or central Wales, and that would present exactly the same problems.
	I recognised that the amendments would be spoken to with passion from the Liberal Benches. They are after all at the heart of what the Liberal party largely exists for, which is electoral change. I notice that the noble Lord, Lord Elystan-Morgan, identified his reservations about any assembly which had members who were elected in different forms. I do not know where the noble Lord stands on the question of reform of this House, but I have not heard anyone advocate such change in this House, unless they are in favour of a totally elected House. I have not heard too many representations on that part from Members of this House, and that is also true for representations from the other place. All other representations are for some form of mixed membership, so we may as well recognise that we may need to adjust to that. In a sense, Wales is blazing a trail on that, as is Scotland.
	Therefore, it is not for me to go into a great deal of detail on the amendments. To give the movers of the amendment their proper due, they have put together a group of amendments that makes entire coherent sense if one accepts the propositions that underlie the virtues of the single transferable vote, of large constituencies and a larger assembly. I do not think that case has been made.

Lord Livsey of Talgarth: I have listened to the Minister and to the predictability of some of the things that he said. Before replying directly to what he said, I will say that we have had a useful, wide-ranging debate where a lot of issues have been examined in detail. I thank those Members who supported some of the principles of the single transferable vote. I recognise that devolution is a process, and we are attempting, by putting forward the amendments, to point in the direction of a more proportional system of representation in the Welsh Assembly. I well understand the comments of the noble Lord, Lord Roberts of Conwy, about the breaking of the link with the constituency. That is a big question which needs a lot of consideration. There are arguments about proportionality versus the constituency link.
	I was very pleased to hear the comments of the noble Lord, Lord Richard, on the report of the Richard Commission. After a detailed examination of the situation he said that the committee system could not work with 60; and that it required 80 members to do the job. I do not come from where the Minister was coming from. I want to see an efficient and effective Assembly which has the competence and the time to do the job. He spoke about professional politicians. Would he be more satisfied with amateur ones? Perhaps part of the problem is that we do not have enough professional politicians to do the job required in Wales. I believe that the STV system would provide a fairer and more competent Assembly able to do the job in the time required.
	I agree with the Minister in one respect. The time could be extended. I have no argument with him on that. None the less, with the increased responsibilities placed upon the Assembly, even as the Bill now stands, it is not a satisfactory state of affairs that in some cases there will be only six members per committee. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Elystan-Morgan, and others for their comments on STV. We on these Benches are not "latching on" to the report of the Richard Commission, as the Minister put it. We are considering it as objectively as we can. The Electoral Commission studied it in great depth and agreed with the report's conclusions that the single transferable vote was the best system for Wales. One could boil this down to the tabloid argument: that we have too many politicians already; we do not need any more. Having considered the views in detail, the Electoral Commission has come out in agreement with the report of the Richard Commission in favour of STV. I believe that I can rest my case on those arguments with confidence and, as regards the future, with optimism. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Baroness Finlay of Llandaff: The previous discussion was lengthy but I hope to keep the debate short although the list of amendments seems long. The amendments amount to a simple proposal: to have an all Wales constituency member for the additional member system. I wish to explain why I am proposing the amendment. I recognise that it is a probing amendment and I shall not seek a Division at this stage.
	I refer Members of the Committee to the report on the Government of Wales Bill from the Select Committee on the Constitution which hopes that the Government will take care to explain to the House what other options are being considered; for example, replacing the regional list with a single national list across the whole of Wales. It is with that background that I put forward these amendments.
	One of the problems of the Assembly Members has been that they do not have a clear job description. Those with a constituency, and those off the list, have been confused in their roles. I hope that an all-Wales constituency member would take into his brief a raft of issues quite different from the constituency issues. In Wales we have problems with division. We have geographical divisions which mean that north Wales and south Wales have often functioned somewhat separately and even in the south Wales strip there are differences between the east and the west. However, there are big problems that affect the whole of Wales, one of which is the transport agenda. Transport is notoriously bad in Wales and our roads have notoriously awful accident rates.
	We also have environmental issues that affect the whole of Wales and we have a rural environment in the middle. We have phenomenal potential for tourism and I hope that the tourism industry expands because Wales is an extremely beautiful country for people to visit. The Welsh Development Agency has an all-Wales remit as well. We need inward investment. My concern is that by maintaining small constituencies we do not get away from the rather inward-looking, narrow, local view to take a view of where Wales sits on the world stage and for that to be discussed within the Assembly. I know that it is discussed by representatives of Wales outside Wales, in Europe and so on.
	On a day-to-day basis, the Assembly deals with other issues with all-Wales implications, one of which relates to rationing. There has to be rationing in health and in education; the budget is not limitless. All those discussions have remained very much at the micro level. We have specialist commissioning on an all-Wales basis and yet within the Assembly we do not have a specific group of AMs with responsibility to take an all-Wales view.
	That is the background to my proposing the amendment. My other reason is simply the representation of very small groups within Wales. Looking at the system, it seems to me that it would just about be impossible for a member of a very small party, such as the Green Party, or someone standing as an independent, ever to stand a chance of being elected. I hope that, if it were possible to have an all-Wales constituency member, that may also be possible for small parties. I use the Green Party as an example. I am not advocating that party above any other small party but it happened to come to mind. It should also be possible for someone who wishes to stand on an independent ticket in Wales because I think that would bring a degree of diversity to the Assembly and might move it beyond the four main planks of political parties that there are at the moment.
	There is the question of whether the list could be loaded—whether one would find that one political party would squeeze all its high-profile people at the top of the list into one area and somehow achieve a takeover bid. I think the Assembly itself would have to decide the role of an all-Wales constituency Member and how he or she would operate. With that background, I tabled these amendments. I hope that the Committee feels that they warrant at least a brief discussion and I welcome the response of the Minister. I beg to move.

Lord Thomas of Gresford: We move to the issue of general elections. Clause 4 is concerned with the power to vary the date of an ordinary general election and Clause 5 deals with extraordinary general elections. The point that I wish to raise with the Minister—and I shall be very interested in his response—is why the Secretary of State is the person who in Clause 4 can vary the date of the ordinary general election and why it is the Secretary of State who proposes the extraordinary general election under Clause 5.
	That is not the case in Scotland. The Scotland Act 1998 places upon the Presiding Officer the duty of proposing a day for holding the poll which is not more than one month earlier nor more than one month later than the first Thursday in May. Again, for an extraordinary general election in Scotland it is the Presiding Officer who proposes the day for the holding of a poll if the Parliament resolves that it should be resolved by a resolution of two-thirds of its Members voting.
	I think that it will be generally recognised as the Bill proceeds that one of the issues that we take with the Bill is the powers it gives to the Secretary of State. It is as though in Scotland the officers of the Parliament can be trusted but in Wales it is necessary to have a Westminster Minister take over some of the functions used by the Presiding Officer in Scotland. Accordingly, my Amendment No. 8 would replace the Secretary of State with the Presiding Officer; to give him the power to propose the day for the holding of a poll on a day which is not the first Thursday in May within the limits specified; and that he should have that power only if the Assembly has passed a resolution in favour with at least two-thirds of the Members voting to support it. Your Lordships will see that Clause 4(5) states:
	"No order is to be made under this section unless the Secretary of State has consulted the Welsh Ministers about it".
	There is nothing like that in Scotland. The Scottish Parliament controls this issue. Why should the Secretary of State consult not the Assembly itself but the Welsh Ministers about the important issue of varying the date of the election?
	Similarly, Amendment No. 11 would replace "Secretary of State" in Clause 5(1) with "Presiding Officer". Amendment No. 12 makes it clear that the resolution of the Assembly is passed on a vote in which the number of Assembly Members voting in favour of it is not less than two thirds of the total number of Assembly "members voting", as opposed to "seats". Amendment No. 13 would replace "Secretary of State" with "Presiding Officer" in Clause 5(4). The Government ought to trust the Presiding Officer in Wales to fulfil precisely the same functions as the Presiding Officer in Scotland. I beg to move.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
	[Amendments Nos. 9 and 10 not moved.]
	Clause 4 agreed to.
	Clause 5 [Extraordinary general elections]:
	[Amendments Nos. 11 to 13 not moved.]
	Clause 5 agreed to.
	Clause 6 [Voting at general elections]:
	[Amendments Nos. 14 and 15E not moved.]
	Clause 6 agreed to.
	Clause 7 [Candidates at general elections]:
	[Amendments Nos. 15F and 15G not moved.]

Lord Livsey of Talgarth: Amendment No. 16 has a very straightforward objective, to establish open lists for Assembly elections. The amendment states that the regional returning officer shall publish the list of candidates submitted by each political party for each electoral region. The implication is that the candidates will not be ranked in order, but will nevertheless be on a list of candidates from the party. The virtue of open lists is that the electorate actually decides who they wish to elect. This is a method of election used by a number of countries which function on the basis of additional member systems. The different members elected are absolutely clear. They have been the choice of the electorate. This is a very transparent method of conducting a list system. The electorate could, if they wish, for example, choose on the basis of gender. Maybe they would prefer a female candidate, or a member of a political party who has a viewpoint that may not comply with the strictest interpretation of the party. If they want to elect a younger or older person because they feel this would be the right choice in the circumstances, they can. The electorate hold the decisions in their hands and not the party. We believe that this very important principle would extend democracy for the electorate. Indeed it might actually encourage them to participate in elections more, which would be a very good thing. I beg to move.

Lord Roberts of Conwy: As the Bill stands, constituency candidates will not be able to stand as regional list candidates and vice versa. The aim of Amendment No. 17 is to preserve the status quo. As far as I can make out, only the Government and the Labour Party wish to change the system in the way proposed—all the other political parties and a string of organisations, ranging from the Electoral Commission to the Electoral Reform Society and the Arbuthnott commission, are opposed to, or critical of, the change. The case for the change has not been proven. There has not been sufficient consultation on it.
	The origins of the pressure for change are well described in the Richard commission report and lie in the rivalry between the constituency and the regional list Members of the Assembly. Of the 20 elected under AMS in 2003, 17 stood as first-past-the post-candidates—although I am not absolutely sure about the figure, because I have seen 18 quoted. Many electors would take the view that competition between the two kinds of members to serve electors is no bad thing and keeps both on their toes, but the sitting constituency members do not relish having rival regional list members breathing down their necks as well as the usual constituency candidates, of which the regional list member may have been one prior to the Bill. But that situation will continue, even if the Government's proposed change comes into effect. The only difference will be that the list member will not also be a failed constituency candidate. There will be nothing to stop the list member standing as a constituency candidate the next time round—it is only a matter of time.
	What is the real motivation behind the change that the Government propose? The starting point is that Labour has no regional list members. Also relevant is the fact that its hold on the Assembly Government is precarious, as we have heard, and they are totally dependent on their constituency members, some of whom have slender majorities. They must therefore be protected at all costs. The prohibition of dual candidacy strengthens the position of Labour members in their constituencies by weakening the minority parties' attempts to undermine them from a position of strength on the regional list. To put that another way, Labour immunity in the constituencies that they occupy is improved if they are walled in against attack from regional members. Furthermore, the minority parties have to find more candidates, and more numbers usually means less quality.
	Of course, the Labour Party will never admit that the purpose of the change is to strengthen its own side and to weaken its opponents, so we are presented with a variety of bogus populist arguments. People, it is said, do not understand how losers under the first-past-the-post vote can be elected under the additional member system with its separate vote. The White Paper states:
	"In the Government's view, for losing candidates to be able to become Assembly Members regardless of their constituency election results both devalues the integrity of the electoral system in the eyes of the public and acts as a disincentive to vote in constituency elections".
	Where is the evidence for those assertions, and how will the Government's amendment restore the integrity of the system and encourage people to vote?
	The most damning indictment of the Government's case for the amendment is the fact that they have set their hearts and minds firmly against making a similar change in Scotland, where the AMS system also operates. They said so in this House, when replying to the Second Reading debate on the Bill proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes of Cumnock, on 3 March. That debate followed soon after the publication of the Arbuthnott commission report, which disposed very effectively of the arguments against AMS, as my noble friend Lord Strathclyde pointed out in the course of the debate. But Arbuthnott went further, saying:
	"Preventing dual candidacy would be undemocratic. It would place an unnecessary restriction on the democratic rights of individual candidates, parties and local electors to have as unrestricted a choice as possible in an election".
	That is a very serious charge from a very serious quarter, which I hope the Government will answer.
	There is also a human rights dimension to this. They cannot say yes to that statement in Scotland and no in Wales. Such blatant inconsistency is pretty well intolerable. The Government should not be allowed to get away with it.
	Speaking of the Arbuthnott report reminds me that a quotation from the report is included in the Government's collection of statements supporting their opposition to dual candidacy. The thrust of the report as a whole is in quite the opposite direction. We were fortunate at Second Reading that the noble Lord, Lord Steel of Aikwood, who was also twice quoted in the same document, was present in the Chamber to assert that his statement had been taken out of context and should not have been used to buttress the Government's case. The noble Lord said:
	"It is a bit of a sleight of hand that I should be quoted in aid of a provision which I do not agree with".—[Official Report, 22/3/06; col. 263.]
	I am sure that his view would be reiterated by the authors of the Arbuthnott report.
	Another much quoted document in this context is the Labour Party manifesto. But of course there are two references, one of which relates to the UK, referring briefly to Wales, and the other more expansively to Wales. The UK manifesto reference is to,
	"a reformed structure and electoral system to make the exercise of Assembly responsibilities clearer and more accountable to the public".
	The Welsh manifesto goes beyond talk of responsibility and accountability to say that alongside these changes,
	"we will prevent candidates from standing on both the list and in a constituency in order to make all candidates genuinely accountable to the electorate and to end Assembly Members being elected via the backdoor even when they have already been rejected by the voters".
	The wording echoes, of course, the New Brunswick Commission on Legislative Democracy, quoted by the Government in their compendium of quotations. It shows a total failure to understand the nature of the AMS system that the Government themselves set up under the 1998 Act.
	The Government will argue that we should respect the inviolability of their manifesto and will probably accuse us of contravening the Salisbury convention if we do not respect it. However, I have made enough of a case for the Government to answer and know that many other noble Lords will want to lend their support to my case. I beg to move.

Lord Livsey of Talgarth: I very much support the amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord Roberts of Conwy. He has stated all the reasons why the AMS system is much preferable to the one proposed in the Bill, which denies dual candidacy. The origins of this would seem to be that in one constituency in Wales, Clwyd West, three out of four of the losers were elected under the regional list system. However, that is the only example in the whole of Wales where that actually occurred. This seems to be one of the reasons stated as to why dual candidacies should be prohibited, but the whole weight of informed opinion is in favour of, at the very least, retaining the existing system. The Electoral Commission has in fact slammed the proposals in a focused and logical way. The Electoral Reform Society, which is extremely well informed on these issues and practises them, also cannot accept them. We must realise that the additional-member system is going on in different countries in Europe; and British/UK constitutional lawyers designed the system in West Germany. No one can say that West Germany has not been a successful democracy since the Second World War. It has carried out a system similar to that which has been used in the Welsh Assembly. Reference has been made to the Arbuthnott report, which supports dual candidacy. My noble friend Lord Steel, was undoubtedly quoted out of context, as the noble Lord, Lord Roberts of Conwy, said. In fact, my noble friend Lord Steel stated that he advocates the single transferable vote and he said so in his intervention at Second Reading.

Lord Foulkes of Cumnock: May I quote the noble Lord, Lord Steel, directly from his Edinburgh Book Festival lecture on 18 August 2003? He said,
	"The system as operated . . . has led to a confusing and expensive proliferation of 'parliamentary' offices throughout the country. In at least one town there are four. They have become a thinly disguised subsidy from the taxpayer for the local party machines . . . In my view they are a serious waste of public money".
	That is clear: that is not out of context. It is very much in context and it is very true.

Lord Foulkes of Cumnock: With respect to the noble Lord, Lord Livsey, we are not talking about single transferable vote. We are talking about dual candidacy under the AMS system.

Lord Foulkes of Cumnock: I can tell the noble Lord that I am working hard on the Government. I keep on working on them; I have my ways and I will find a different way. I return to the noble Lord, Lord Livsey, who said that the weight of informed opinion in Wales is in favour of the amendment and against dual candidacy. How is it that on 15 June 2005—relatively recently—it was said:
	"I am sure that many in Wales will welcome . . . the removal of the absurd dual candidacy opportunity".—[Official Report, 15/6/06; col. 1217.]
	I could not have put it better myself, but it was not me who said that; it was the noble Lord, Lord Carlile of Berriew, the former leader of the Welsh Liberal Democrats. Obviously he is not informed opinion in Wales.

Lord Crickhowell: I am sure that we have all enjoyed the exchanges between the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes of Cumnock, and the Liberal Democrat and Plaid Cymru parties. However, I was a little surprised when he attacked Plaid Cymru for furthering its party's cause. I cannot believe that the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes of Cumnock, has ever sought to further his party's cause. Of course, he has; he has spent a whole lifetime doing it. He attacks the Electoral Reform Society and the Electoral Commission, but I am bound to say that if I wanted to hear a balanced view, I would want to hear the views of those two bodies quite as much as the views of the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes of Cumnock.
	Although it has been referred to on a number of occasions already in this debate, we need to be reminded again that almost all the independent organisations of weight have come down against the Government. I refer to the two organisations I have just mentioned and, most effectively of all, the Arbuthnott commission in relation to the Scottish Parliament.
	The Select Committee on the Constitution of this House referred to all those bodies and pointed out that,
	"the bar on dual candidacy has very few international precedents. On the contrary, dual candidacy is a common and accepted feature in proportional systems across the world".
	Professor Hazell, director of the Constitution Unit within University College London, has described the Government's alteration to the electoral arrangements as,
	"nasty, parochial and seemingly driven by partisan motives".
	Mr Stoner, the parliamentary officer of the Electoral Reform Society wrote to thank me for my remarks on the subject at Second Reading. He wrote that the society has been,
	"most concerned at how the Government have sought to justify their proposal by claiming a cross-party consensus on an issue that has proved controversial in the extreme".
	The comments of Sir John Arbuthnott's commission on boundary differences and voting systems in Scotland are, to my mind, devastating. The commission took the trouble to look very closely at the Welsh arguments. It seems to me that its conclusions are devastating in the context of both the opinions of Mr Hain in Wales and of the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes of Cumnock, in Scotland. Having read the arguments of both and heard the noble Lord advance his case on an earlier occasion in this House, it seems to me that the Arbuthnott commission comes out on top. The commission states:
	"However, the Commission is not convinced that there is any evidence to support the claims made regarding these perceived problems. There is no survey evidence to suggest that dual candidacy is an issue for voters, or a disincentive to their participation in the political process".
	The noble Lord, Lord Foulkes of Cumnock, quoted a few individuals, but a few individuals who express views but do not understand the principles on which the electoral system is based are hardly evidence of a compelling weight.
	The commission has serious concerns about the impact such a ban would have. It points out that, as the Richard commission had noted,
	"it may encourage parties, particularly small ones, not to field strong candidates in constituency seats, where they have less chance of success, keeping them instead for the region where they would be more likely to be elected. This could have a negative impact on the quality of constituency contests and unduly favour incumbent candidates".
	The commission advances other arguments. It points to examples elsewhere and suggests that,
	"dual candidacy only seems problematic to some people here because of the legacy of constituency representation within British political culture and the hegemony which this has secured for some parties. Candidates coming in second or third place who are then elected through the regional list are only 'losers' in the context of a first past the post, 'winner takes all', electoral system. This logic does not sit well within a proportional system and introducing it devalues and undermines the concept of proportionality".
	My noble friend Lord Roberts of Conwy has already quoted the commission's conclusion that,
	"preventing dual candidacy would be undemocratic and . . . . that it would place 'an unnecessary restriction on the democratic rights of potential candidates, parties and local electors to have as unrestricted a choice as possible in an election'".
	In the Welsh Assembly committee on the Bill, all the parties except Labour voted against the clause as it stands in the Bill at present. When this House finds that almost all independent opinion expressed by the Electoral Commission, the Electoral Reform Society, the Arbuthnott commission and the Richard commission is against a change in electoral arrangements, and that it is opposed by the other political parties, surely it is entitled to say, "No, we cannot allow that". Here I take up the issue that was touched on by my noble friend Lord Roberts of Conwy. I go further and say that we have a clear duty to prevent abuse of this kind. Surely by far the most important function of this House is to act as the final guardian of constitutional integrity and electoral propriety.
	The Government will argue that this was a manifesto commitment. But I reject the argument that that prevents us from acting. It cannot, surely, be suggested that any party is free to fix the electoral system to its own advantage, just because it makes a reference to it somewhere in its manifesto. Mr Blair is always telling us that he has a great deal of unfinished business. If his party were to declare in its next manifesto that he had so much to do that he intended to extend the life of the next Parliament to enable him to complete his great work, it would surely be the duty of this House to say, "No, you will not. You will continue to have to face the electorate at the appropriate time". The argument is exactly the same. Here we are faced with a highly controversial change in electoral arrangements, when the kind of consensus that should always exist when changing electoral arrangements simply does not exist. I am sure that we should stand our ground and say that we cannot permit it to happen. The Minister, who has already said that change should not take place in Scotland, should acknowledge that his arguments apply equally and as strongly in Wales. I urge the House to support my noble friends' amendment.

Lord Roberts of Llandudno: I do not think I have ever heard a better argument for single transferable votes than the one we had from the Labour Benches and from the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, this evening. If he is favour of any sort of proportionality, if he then rejects the present system, surely he must walk in the direction of STV.
	Let us look at the argument made that the list candidates should not also be constituency candidates, because you have offices, and so on, and organisations within the regions that might be campaigning within an opponent's constituency. What you will have on the list will be different names from those in the constituencies. If you take the quotation from the Plaid Cymru Member of the Assembly, however, the campaigning element is still there. The promotion of their party interests is still there, because all you have is a change in the names—the prohibition of the constituency candidate also being a list candidate. The Government's proposal today and the noble Lord's proposal for Scotland do not solve the problem. The problem, as we mentioned earlier this evening, is that we have not yet defined the role of the regional Members, compared to that of the constituency Members. It is our failing.
	I will be brief and I will not go back to the arguments that we had at Second Reading. So I suggest that we do listen to the reports that we mentioned: Arbuthnott, Richard, the Electoral Commission and the Electoral Reform Society. Even public opinion polls see no problem at all in dual candidacy. Perhaps they do not have time to do anything else except tinker with an electoral system. This House would be doing a great service by voting to say, "Yes, of course". The rights of the individual demand it. Ordinary electoral consideration to get the best people into the Parliament in Scotland and the Assembly in Wales also should allow it.
	I will conclude with this. Last week, there was a list of working Peers. Now, some of us did not win an ordinary election for the other House, but we landed here. Last week, the list of working Peers gave us four or five people who had lost their seats in the general election. I hope to embrace them because I was previously one of them. The argument you give is not an argument that I can accept.

Lord Davies of Oldham: We have had an interesting debate. Of course, the main principles of the debate revolve around Amendment No. 17. Therefore, with the leave of the Committee, I will address my preliminary remarks to the other amendments. On behalf of the Government, I will seek to resist those principles.
	Noble Lords will recognise that Amendment Nos. 18 and 19, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Livsey, go further than reinstating the status quo with regards to dual candidacy. These amendments would remove the bars that already exist in the Government of Wales Act 1998. These amendments would allow a candidate to stand for election in a constituency that is not included in the region for which he or she appears on a list, and also to represent different parties for the constituency and for the region. This is not allowed under the 1998 Act, and for good reasons indeed. Allowing a candidate to stand in any region and constituency, and to represent more than one political party, would surely undermine our electoral system. I hope the House will recognise that we are strongly against Amendments Nos. 18 and 19.
	Amendment No. 22, in the name of the noble Lords, Lord Roberts of Conwy, Lord Henley and Lord Crickhowell, also goes back to the Government's commitment to banning dual candidacy and the integrity of our electoral system. Standing as a constituency candidate in a by-election, failing to get elected, and then returning to a party's list to fill a regional vacancy would, in our view, once again clearly be seen as an example of a candidate trying to get in through the back door. That is our principle objection to Amendment No. 17.
	The noble Lord, Lord Roberts of Conwy, is right. Of course I will quote the manifesto commitment, because we made it quite explicit. The Labour Party does not produce a Labour manifesto for the United Kingdom, it produces a manifesto for England, for Wales and for Scotland. Our Welsh manifesto said:
	"We will prevent from standing on both the list and inner constituency, in order to make all candidates accountable to the electorate, and to end Assembly Members being elected via the backdoor even when they have already been rejected by the voters".
	That is a manifesto commitment. The argument that I have had against it this evening is that this House, under the arguments of the noble Lord, Lord Crickhowell, is better equipped to defend the liberties and the rights of the British people with regard to elections. Which part of legislation conveys that position upon this House? Is it the Parliament Act 1911, which sought to restrain this House after the democratic other place had enacted legislation and which the people had endorsed by election manifesto in the election? Does the Parliament Act 1948 convey this position upon this House, when again it is was quite clear that both the people and a government with a large majority sought to restrain the powers of this House? Or does the noble Lord say that because, at last, in the 21st century, Labour has the same number of votes in this House as the Conservative Party—and that is all the Government have; an equality of votes with the Conservative Party, which has enjoyed a huge majority of votes ever since this House was created—this House, having the two main parties in equality, can take upon itself the right to be the arbiter or defender of the British people's rights with regard to election? I maintain that that argument is shot through with fallacy. Of course it is important that this House plays its proper role as a revising Chamber, which we seek to do as fully and as ably as we can. This is a forum for considerable debate on the issues before the nation, but there are limits on the powers of this House which are properly there, and they are cast both in convention—reference has been made to the Salisbury convention—and particularly in manifesto commitments. We made that commitment in the manifesto, and we did so because we are dealing with an issue of principle.

Lord Davies of Oldham: We will address those issues in good time. I have already indicated to the noble Lord that we have not replied to the Arbuthnott report, which is a serious document that deserves serious consideration. We have not responded to that as yet, but in this Bill we are legislating with regard to Wales, because that is where a clear issue arose.
	The noble Lord, Lord Crickhowell, said that the Government were bent on partisan activity and said that all others were ranged against the Government. I do not think that we are being partisan; the reform will affect all parties equally. No party will gain or lose a single vote or seat in the Assembly as a result of this change. Three Ministers in the Welsh Assembly Government are currently in marginal seats. They will also lose the safety net that the list system would otherwise have provided. It will not do for noble Lords to suggest that the Government are taking through a narrow, partisan matter to look after their own in Wales. Some of the crucial people who serve the Labour Party in Wales will make the inevitable sacrifice and there will be no safety net for them.
	It will remove unfairness in the current system. In doing so, it will improve the electoral system. We maintain that the proposals in Clause 7 to prevent candidates standing both in a constituency and on a regional list will strengthen the integrity of the system. It puts the voters in charge by enabling them to choose successful candidates and reject unsuccessful candidates who cannot then arrive in the Assembly through the back door.
	On the basis of those arguments, I hope that the noble Lord will feel able to withdraw the amendment. I recognise the genuineness of the views of the noble Lord, Lord Roberts, and the strength with which he has presented them. However, I ask him to recognise that we are not putting forward a casual clause in a Bill. We are fulfilling a clear, specific promise to the people of Wales on how we would deal with a problem identified in the elections for the Welsh Assembly in 2003. We are fulfilling that commitment through this legislation. We have the right and the obligation to do so. This House should tread carefully when such explicit commitments are being made by a properly elected Government.

Lord Norton of Louth: I speak against the amendment, since I spoke against votes at 16 on the Electoral Administration Bill. I intend to be perfectly consistent. I say that despite the fact that I joined my political party at the age of 13—they allowed me to join earlier. However, I have always been opposed to lowering the voting age.
	There are two objections to this amendment. One is its inclusion in this Bill. Any amendment to do with the voting age should be in national legislation, not specific to a particular part of the United Kingdom. The second is more substantive on the arguments. I notice that, in moving it, the noble Lord, Lord Livsey of Talgarth, did not even present any, which suggests that his party may have lost heart in the case for votes at 16. I shall immodestly assume that that is because of my persuasive arguments on the Electoral Administration Bill, but let me knock the noble Lord's arguments on the head anyway.
	We are normally told that 16 year-olds can get married, join the Army and pay income tax. That in itself is misleading. You cannot marry at 16 unless you have parental consent; if you join the Armed Forces, you are not sent to the front line; and hardly any 16 year-olds pay income tax. In any event, there is a distinction to be drawn between where we allow 16 year-olds to do certain things and lowering the voting age to 16. In many areas where people are allowed to do things at 16, you are empowering not 16 year-olds but those who can select 16 year-olds to do particular tasks. These things cannot be exercised by all 16 year-olds; they are empowering other people. You can join the Army at 16, but you must be selected to do so, widening the pool available to the Army in making that choice. If 16 year-olds are going to be given the power to join boards of companies, again, the companies are being empowered, not so much the 16 year-olds. There is a filtering mechanism, rather than allowing 16 year-olds to exercise a power directly.
	There is also a distinction to be drawn between lowering the voting age and lowering the age at which one can stand for election to public office. If you are going to lower an age, lower the age at which you can stand for election, for the reason I have just given: you are not empowering 16-year-olds, you are empowering the electors. It is then up to them to choose whoever they wish. There is a crucial distinction there.
	I am not persuaded that a compelling case has been made for lowering the voting age. It is not standard practice elsewhere. I know the argument is that it would encourage 16 year-olds to get more involved. I go round and speak to sixth forms; they are very interested in politics. The problem is that we must address those who are not in the sixth forms, and this is not going to encourage them. We must get them interested in the first place, and just opening up the voting system will not do that in itself. We must look at other routes for achieving it. I am not persuaded that there is a case for lowering the voting age, and it is completely inappropriate in the context of this Bill.

Viscount Slim: My Lords, it is pretty daunting for the Army when something like the Deepcut story happens. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Ashley of Stoke, for bringing the subject back to your Lordships' House. I have seldom read a review or a report of such depth and undertaken with such care and thoroughness as that of Nicholas Blake. He really has tried to find out why there are four or five dead soldiers. Of course, the Deepcut situation over the four or five years was not a very happy one. People were hanging about waiting for trade training, there was a moving population, boredom, little or no stimulation from the authorities and a lack of sufficient junior officers and NCOs. I read somewhere that there were 500 personnel, two officers, three sergeants and four or five corporals. That is not the way to train people or to hold them and keep their enthusiasm while they are waiting to go elsewhere.
	The worse aspect I felt about that was the lack of trained instructors, officers and NCOs and the lack of supervision during off-duty time. Not much initiative was shown for continuing training. These chaps were soldiers; they were meant to be soldiers; they were half-trained, quarter-trained and some of them nearly trained. Even within the confines of the camp there are so many things that one could take forward in the way of training. Soldiers work at night. There was no sign of night training and no sign of physical fitness and keeping the chaps ready for their operations when they eventually got there.
	Frankly, there was a complete lack of leadership at times. That is very disturbing. I was also disturbed about how the shootings were investigated. There seems to have been a very weak effort as regards forensics and ballistics, fingerprinting and blood sampling—all the usual things. Documents apparently were lost, reports were lost and not recovered, and there was definitely muddle and tension between the various investigating agencies. I must say that at one stage I certainly felt a suspicion of a cover up.
	Perhaps I may speak as a very old soldier and quite out of date—we never let a man go on sentry duty until he was properly trained and had been either with an officer, an NCO or a trained soldier. For some of these chaps the only darkness they have seen is the semi-darkness of a disco. Out at night with a terrorist threat in varying degrees, particularly at the time of 9/11, it seems extraordinary to me that the teaching of how to be a sentry was just reading something by the orderly warrant officer every night and then a sergeant shoving chaps off in various directions. It is an art to be a good sentry and an alert sentry. That was lacking. After all, we depend on the Royal Logistic Corps for so much in the Army. The Army would not work without it and it requires an up-to-date, very with it, Royal Logistic Corps.
	I am worried about the way the parents were treated. I am particularly worried where an officer went off to tell a father and mother that their boy was dead and he did not tell the mother, who was all alone, but waited for the father to come in from work. I cannot understand why someone could not have got the father there first. There are ways of doing this. We have all had to go and tell a wife, a mother or a father that their boy was dead and there are ways to do that. I am unhappy by reading quite a bit in the review about that.
	I think that perhaps now—I do not disagree with the thrust of what the noble Lord, Lord Ashley of Stoke, said—this review does end the matter, but I do not see it bringing a great deal of comfort to the parents. It has taken too long. It has taken years to do something about four or five soldiers that could have been done in a much shorter time. I think that those concerned should not be very pleased with the way things have worked out. But I hope that in a little way this review brings some comfort. At least Mr Blake has tried to get to the bottom of everything.
	However, there is something missing. I cannot put my finger on it; other noble Lords may be able to do so. I just do not understand a number of things— where the bullets went and how they got there. I do not understand and I am horrified at the way the sentries were briefed and not trained. As I said to the Minister when we first raised this point, from top to bottom, where were the officers?

Earl Attlee: My Lords, I remind the House of my peripheral interest. I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Ashley of Stoke, for giving us such an early opportunity to debate this report. The House will be grateful to Mr Blake for his excellent report. It answers many of my questions but it also alerts me to some very serious problems. Most importantly, it allays my worst fears because we were all worried that something simply ghastly was going on in respect of the deaths. I simply did not know the answer. I can say that I know numerous RLC officers and junior soldiers. I have served with them as a junior soldier, so I know them very well. If there was something really awful to report, I am sure they would have told me; and they never did. I never heard anything close to the lurid accusations that we have read about in the media, and I listened very intently.
	However, the report is very detailed. I think that perhaps it could have been written a bit more succinctly so that more would read the whole report. Of course, listening to the noble Viscount, Lord Slim, it is quite clear that he has read the report from cover to cover. I read it over the Recess. Given that the usual channels agreed to such an early UQ, has the Minister read the report?
	All noble Lords should be grateful for Mr Blake's analysis of all the available evidence. He really seems to understand the military realities of operating such a large base. I have a little concern about the report's excessive reliance on standing orders from high-level headquarters. He frequently refers to Land standing orders. I confess I have never read all the Land standing orders. When I was in command I never even read the district standing orders. No one does. The noble Viscount is smiling at me because he knows that I am right. The reality is that no one reads all the reports or all the orders. If you want them all read and complied with, or at least for people to try to comply with them all, you would need to employ a captain at every single unit to be a compliance officer.
	In 1998, as officer commanding a TA company, one document I studied very carefully, because if the worst happened I would not have the opportunity to study it in time, was the casualty procedure—a point referred to by the noble Viscount. But I am not completely confident with Fiona Murphy's analysis of that procedure in Annex C. I am not fully convinced that she researched her conclusions. For instance, she queries why the casualty procedure is a classified document marked "Restricted". If she had asked any officer, he would have explained that "Restricted" is the lowest security classification possible. The workshop manual for a Land Rover is graded "Restricted". "Restricted" really means "don't give the whole document to the media". It seems to me that she did not arrange for a sanity check by an experienced retired officer, but I also think that she does not understand the challenges of casualty notification. Any casualty notification system needs to be able to deal with at least 1,000 casualties in one day, but, at the same time, the next of kin needs to be notified within about two hours of the casualty occurring. In addition, the notifying officers need to be course-trained. You cannot use any officer; they must know what they are doing because it is such a sensitive task.
	Bad news travels very fast today, but I was surprised when, a few months ago, it appeared that a next of kin was notified of a casualty at 3 am. That was completely contrary to the casualty report system that I read in 1998, but the procedure has been updated. This had been made necessary by modern communications equipment, particularly the mobile phone and the internet. I know some casualty notification officers very well indeed. My information is that the casualty procedure system is fit for purpose, and that the Minister has no problems there.
	However, Fiona Murphy's work uncovers an inexplicable and glaring failure. That is the apparent total lack of interest on the part of the commanding officers and other officers at Deepcut in the feelings of the families. It is no surprise that they began to suspect that something sinister may have happened. I certainly do not understand why each family was not invited to Deepcut at an early opportunity. I am sure that if the families had seen and sensed how upset the whole garrison would have been after each event, they might not so easily have become convinced that something had gone very wrong. I wish that Mr Blake had perhaps used his skill and looked a bit closer at why those visits did not occur. Perhaps somebody made a decision that the families were not to be invited to the garrison; perhaps orders were given that that could not happen.
	Clearly, as we have all read in the report, something has gone very wrong. The report referred to sub-standard warrant officers who had been reduced to the rank. It stated that the Deepcut training regiment was, and perhaps still is, under-resourced in accommodation and manpower. We read about the lack of secure accommodation for female soldiers. Worst of all, we read about some—though they were only a minority—exceptionally poor-quality junior officers. I have never heard of an officer receiving a confidential report that was so damning. I think that the brigadier wrote, "I have absolutely no confidence in this officer at all". If I received a confidential report like that, I would say, "Well, boss, when do you want me to go?"
	The other serious problem that was identified in the report was the very poor police investigation—the noble Viscount talked about that. In the early cases, the Surrey police and the Royal Military Police did not know who had primacy in the investigation. The noble Lord called for a public inquiry, but there is no further evidence to be gained because all the documents have been destroyed under routine processes. I am shocked by how little ballistic work was done on the early casualties.
	The good news, if there is any, is that the report states quite clearly that all the deaths were self-inflicted and that bullying or anything worse was not a factor. However, there should not be a public inquiry for the reasons that Mr Blake so cogently laid out. Mr Blake made numerous recommendations, but I have not been able to give them direct attention because it is too early. However, your Lordships will shortly be working on the Armed Forces Bill. The Bill is highly desirable—we have been asking for it for many years. While it will certainly pass well before the State Opening, I know that many noble Lords will take a keen interest in it and that numerous amendments will certainly be derived from this report.
	Those young soldiers will not have died in vain. We will not sweep under the carpet the problems identified in the report and I am sure that all involved, whether in this House or in the Armed Forces, will do everything they can to eliminate or at least reduce this dreadful problem.

Lord Livsey of Talgarth: Clause 27 has involved in it a simple principle, which is that we do not want people belonging to the same political group. This amendment concerns the Assembly Commission and its constitution of members of different political persuasions, and provides a fair representation on the Assembly Commission itself. It is a principle of representation which we regard as extremely important as it provides a proper balance.
	What is more important in one way, as far as this debate is concerned, is Amendment No. 32. The reasons for the changes we wish to make to this amendment will become apparent in a minute. On page 18, at line 9, we wish to leave out subsections (2) to (9) and insert:
	"(2) The members of any committee established by the Assembly under section 28(1)—
	(a) shall be elected by the Assembly from among the Assembly members, and
	(b) shall, unless that committee exists solely to provide advice, be elected so as to secure that, as far as is practicable, the balance of the parties in the Assembly is reflected in the membership of the committee".
	That is a principle that we here at Westminster adhere to pretty strongly in committees of both Houses and it reflects the results of voting in elections, so there is membership of committees that follows that pattern.
	Proposed new subsection (3) in the amendment states:
	"(3) The committees established by the Assembly under section 28(1) shall be, as far as is practicable, chaired by members of political parties in proportion to the number of members of the Assembly belonging to each party".
	The effect of this is to remove the d'Hondt process of allocation from establishing the chair of the political parties involved in the Assembly Commission. The d'Hondt method is unsatisfactory and was abandoned by West Germany in 1970. It was also abandoned in its use by the Scottish Parliament because it was thought that there was not a fair representation.
	I want to quote a few things in this debate. It was the intention of the Presiding Officer of the Assembly—the noble Lord, Lord Elis-Thomas—to be here today, but unfortunately he had to go to a funeral of a relatively young man who he knew well in Bala. He is sad not to be able to make representations about this part of the Bill. He is fully in support of the content of the Bill, with one exception—Clause 29, with which he is in total disagreement. It is the only part of the Bill that he feels strongly about.
	We are informed in the Explanatory Notes that the clause is intended to lay down a formula for use in:
	"The allocation of seats on committees between different political groups . . . according to a d'Hondt formula . . . which is . . . used . . . to determine the allocation of electoral region seats in the Assembly for each region".
	It is also used in,
	"section 29 of the Northern Ireland Act 1998 to allocate committee chairs and deputy chairs".
	There is no doubt that this clause has been included to give a built-in advantage to the majority party in the National Assembly. Well, we can argue about that. D'Hondt invariably gives a disproportionate advantage to the majority party in contrast to the Sainte-Lague divisor rule, for instance. I am not going to go into all the niceties of all these formulas and formulations, but by abandoning the d'Hondt principle a fairer result would occur if the Assembly itself made the decision on securing a proper balance.
	On Second Reading, noble Lords expressed concern about Clause 29 and its impact on the working of the National Assembly. Members from all parts of the House stated their opposition to this clause, including the noble Lords, Lord Crickhowell and Lord Henley, and the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay. In his closing remarks, the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Oldham, misunderstood the nature of the impact of Clause 29. He said:
	"The principle behind it is that there needs to be a formula that guarantees in relatively small Assemblies with relatively small committees"—
	and that surely applies in the case of the National Assembly—
	"that there is appropriate representation for minorities".—[Official Report, 22/3/06; col. 326-27.]
	That is not the case with this clause; if it were so, I would have no quarrel with it.
	On many aspects of this Bill, the Government have said in effect that details with regard to scrutiny, legislative competence and much of the working of the Bill in relation to the Assembly should be determined by the Assembly through its Standing Orders. It is believed that this is the right approach and that there is opposition to prescribing the arrangements for the composition of the Assembly's committees beyond that. The right approach to adopt is the very simple Scottish arrangement in which the composition of the committees is based on a very straightforward clause in the Scotland Act, which states that the composition and membership of the Parliament's committees should,
	"have due regard to the balance of parties within the Parliament".
	Those are issues that exercise the presiding officer of the National Assembly.
	The noble Lord's views are backed up by the House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution, which points out that there is no comparable provision in the Scotland Act. The situation in Scotland in allocating shares is totally different from what is proposed in the Bill. The report states on the basis of the evidence presented to the committee that Clause 29 might be thought an inappropriate incursion into matters that should be left for the Assembly itself to decide. That is actually a judgment that that committee made. All these matters are exercised by Members of the Assembly and their concerns are such.
	An Assembly research paper states that there are only 45 Members to service all the Assembly's committees, and at present it has 16 committees. The Assembly research paper states that on the basis of the Assembly's political balance, a six-man committee would comprise four Labour members and one each from Plaid Cymru and the Conservatives. A seven-member committee would see the addition of a Liberal Democrat member and an eight-member committee would have four Labour members, two Plaid Cymru members, one Conservative and one Liberal Democrat.
	I have made the point; although there are other points that should be made, time is not on our side. Basically, Amendment No. 32 would remove the d'Hondt principle and ensure a fair allocation of committee members for each party, and the distribution of committee chairs would be fairly distributed based on the results of the composition of the Assembly, which is of course related to the elections for the Assembly. I beg to move.

Lord Davies of Oldham: I am grateful to all the noble Lords who have spoken in the debate, which we all recognise has its technical difficulties. First, Amendments Nos. 28 and 29 insert a requirement that the Standing Orders of the Assembly specify that the members of the commission, other than the presiding officer, should not belong to the same political group. We do not think that this statutory constraint on the Standing Orders for the Assembly is needed. The existing Government of Wales Act has been criticised for placing too many limits on the Assembly. We made clear in the White Paper Better Governance for Wales that the Assembly would be given as much freedom as possible—I will come in a moment to the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Crickhowell, with regard to the formula—to make its own decisions about how it will work. This is what this Bill delivers. It is for the Assembly to decide whether it wishes to ensure that the members of the commission all belong to different political groups. I do not think that this House should seek to make the decision for the Assembly by placing the requirement on the face of the Bill, which is what Amendments Nos. 28 and 29 would do.
	The noble Lord, Lord Henley, emphasised that Amendments Nos. 31 and 32 were of particular concern to him. These amendments seek to remove the d'Hondt formula from Clause 29, which deals with the composition of Assembly committees, and they seek to replace it with new requirements.
	I share with the noble Lord, Lord Livsey, sorrow that the presiding officer, the noble Lord, Lord Elis-Thomas, is not with us this evening. We would have benefited from his contribution to this debate, although whether I would have agreed with every word is a different matter altogether. We all understand the reasons why he cannot be present.
	I think that there was a not-so-explicit undertone in what the noble Lord, Lord Crickhowell, said, and in the other contributions as well, that this Bill dictates to the Assembly. It does no such thing; that is not what Clause 29 is about. It is about providing a fallback position—it is the obligation of this Government to be able to ensure that all difficulties are resolved—if in fact the Assembly does not resolve the issues itself. As I understand it from the remarks that have been made so far, contributors to this debate in this House agree that it is vital that committees of the new House are politically balanced, as they obviously play a crucial role in the scrutiny of legislation. The aim is for the political parties in the Assembly to reach agreement on the size and makeup of committees. That is the express purpose behind Clause 29. It is not to undermine the concept that the Assembly does not have the power to reach decisions on its committees of its own volition. It can do so. Clause 29 provides a stable, clear and—as all noble Lords will recognise—an internationally used formula for calculating the political balance on committees, should this not prove to be possible. Clause 29 is merely a fallback formula against the presumption that the Assembly reaches its own decisions. But noble Lords have, this evening, identified that there may be difficulties. That is why the Government have the fallback position in Clause 29. The noble Lord, Lord Henley, identified problems that occur with any size of committee. Both the main illustrations used were committees of six and seven; the present Assembly has no committee below eight. As noble Lords will recognise, the greater the number, the easier it is to be fair with regard to the allocation. It is certainly easier to be fair in ensuring that everyone is represented. If one uses any formula, once you get to 10, 11 or more members of a committee, there will always be the problem that there will be percentage mathematical weights according to the numbers. We all recognise that inevitable consequence of the numbers game, which none of us can avoid.

Lord Thomas of Gresford: If using the d'Hondt system is a fall-back, why do not the Government set out primarily that the numbers of a committee and its make up are to be determined by agreement, and that in the event of disagreement the formula is to apply? In the six and half years that the Assembly has been going, has there been deadlock on the formation of committees? If there has not, why do we have a new provision? What is motivating it? If there has been no deadlock or problem, the only reason for introducing a formula which gives an advantage to the Labour Party is for Labour Party interests.

Lord Livsey of Talgarth: The lead amendment in this group is tabled in my name. There is no doubt that there is a fundamental disagreement between the two sides of the Committee on this situation. The Minister said that Clause 29 does not dictate. It does dictate the d'Hondt method. It is prescriptive. As the noble Lords, Lord Crickhowell and Lord Henley, and my noble friend Lord Thomas said, it does not allow the Assembly to achieve political balance. Clause 29 was said by the Minister to employ an internationally-used formula. It is an internationally-used formula circa 1870 and was abandoned in West Germany in 1970. I shall refer to Scotland in a minute. The Assembly will have greater powers, particularly over Orders in Council. Surely the committees will become more important as time goes on. The Assembly is in favour of units of one Member, not part-Members or fractions of Members, in determining the membership of a committee. The Minister quoted the phrase "goodwill on all sides". There certainly needs to be.
	The first standing order of the Scottish Parliament states:
	"The membership of each committee shall be decided by the Parliament on a motion of the Parliamentary Bureau".
	In its first year, in 1999, the situation in the Scottish Parliament got very difficult. The then Parliament Minister Tom McCabe, MSP, stated:
	"We agreed to use the d'Hondt formula for the allocation of committee places. That formula would not provide any places for Messrs Canavan, Harper or Sheridan—
	I am sure that those three names are well known to the Government Front Bench—
	"but the parties were determined to resist that. In a spirit of fairness, they were determined to find some formula that would allocate a place to each of those three members.
	The d'Hondt formula would have allocated six places on an 11-member committee to the Labour party. To Labour's credit, it immediately recognised that, as it does not have a majority in this chamber, it would not be fair for it to have six places".
	The Parliament amended the situation itself and the d'Hondt formula was not used after that. I think that was a very sensible way of proceeding in his party. So there is no doubt whatever that we will return to this matter. I hope that the Minister will think about it.

Baroness Noakes: In moving Amendment No. 33, I shall speak also to the six other amendments in the group, which stand in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Roberts of Conwy. I do not have a grasp of the Welsh language, unlike my noble friend and several other noble Lords, so, if I may, I shall deal with the amendments using only the English part of them. My noble friend assures me that the translation into Welsh is correct.
	The amendments would replace the title of the committee of the Assembly required by Clause 30. Clause 30 uses the term "Audit Committee", which my amendments would replace with "Accounts Committee". This might seem rather arcane. What is in a name? I argue that there is quite a lot in the name "audit committee", which is why it would be wise of the Government to ensure that there is no confusion about this committee. Noble Lords may expect me to start with audit committees in the private sector in particular, because that is where audit committees started life. But I shall start with audit committees as articulated by Her Majesty's Treasury in its 2003 audit committee handbook. The handbook deals with audit committees in central government, in executive agencies and NDPBs. The preamble to the handbook says:
	"The essence of the function of an audit committee in central government is to support the Accounting Officer (or Board) by monitoring and reviewing both the risk, control and governance processes which have been established in the organisation, and the associated assurance processes".
	It refers to the,
	"independent perspective and a process of constructive challenge . . . . to help them"—
	that is, the accounting officer or board—
	"to be fully assured that the most efficient, effective and economical risk, control and governance processes . . . are optimal".
	So it is clear that the audit committees that are now commonplace throughout central government and, indeed, NDPBs are part of the processes within which the departments and other bodies manage their finances, internal controls and so on.
	Things are a little different in the private sector. Listed companies look to the Combined Code on Corporate Governance, which sets out the basic requirement for them to have an audit committee. There are supporting guidelines specifically on audit committees, which are generally referred to as the Smith guidelines. The watch words in the Smith guidance are "oversight", "assessment" and "review" of the financial statements and the financial controls. The audit committee acts on behalf of the board in overseeing functions which are properly those of management. The core remit in the private sector is rather more narrowly drawn and focuses on financial statements and financial controls.
	With that background we come to the committee that is required by Clause 30, which is entitled "Audit Committee". To look at what that committee is expected to do we have to turn to Clause 142. The essence of the role of the committee is in subsection (1), which states:
	"The Audit Committee may consider, and lay before the Assembly a report on, any accounts, statement of accounts or report laid before the Assembly by . . . the Auditor General".
	Noble Lords will see that that function is quite unlike functions of audit committees that exist either in the public or private sector. Indeed, its remit is pretty much that which is carried by the Public Accounts Committee in another place. Indeed, by virtue of subsection (2) the audit committee may, if the Public Accounts Committee requests it, take evidence from Welsh accounting officers on behalf of the Public Accounts Committee. It emphasises that the committee required by Clause 30 is the Welsh equivalent of the arrangements that exist in another place, as enshrined in the Public Accounts Committee.
	I believe that the language used by Clause 30 is, quite simply, confusing. It is clear that the work that the committee will be required to do is very like that of the Public Accounts Committee in another place, but it is quite unlike the kinds of audit committee that exist either in the public or private sector. It is not an advisory body or one that is supportive of an accounting officer as envisaged in the Treasury's handbook. Indeed, its work is to grill accounting officers on the basis of the Auditor General's reports. Accounting officers who have appeared before the Public Accounts Committee in another place have never described that process as supportive or advisory—and rightly so; nor is it an oversight body acting on behalf of a board, as envisaged in the private sector.
	I understand that the Auditor General has made these general points to the Assembly committee which examined the Government's White Paper Better Governance for Wales and that the committee agreed. I hope that the Government will not saddle the new Welsh Government arrangements with an unnecessarily confusing title for a key committee. My solution is to call the committee an accounts committee to line up with the terminology that is used in another place.
	Amendment No. 34 in the group, in the name of noble Lords on the Liberal Democrats Benches, takes a different approach, but I believe that our underlying aim is the same. I beg to move.

Lord Roberts of Conwy: My amendments are an attempt to strengthen the position of the Welsh language under the Bill. I am glad to see that they are grouped with the new clause proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Prys-Davies. At Second Reading, the noble Lord expressed his concern about the recent treatment of the Welsh language and he has followed it up with his new clause. He is right to be concerned because the Welsh Language Board, established under the 1993 Act, is to be thrown on the bonfire of the quangos that the Assembly Government are to set alight very shortly. What will be left after the embers have cooled is very uncertain. It is that kind of uncertainty—that results from apparently precipitate and unconsidered action—which accounts for much of the distrust surrounding the current Assembly Government.
	The position of the language under the Bill is obscure, to say the least. Under Section 47 of the 1998 Act, there was a duty laid on the Assembly as a corporate body, with executive and legislative functions, to give effect to the conduct of its business to the principle that the two languages should be treated on a basis of equality. The Assembly was also to have regard to the spirit of any guidelines under Section 9 of the 1993 Act, and Standing Orders were to be produced in both languages.
	Now Section 47 is among the many from the 1998 Act that is to be repealed. As the noble Lord, Lord Prys-Davies, has pointed out, its ghost in emaciated form reappears in Clause 35, which imposes an obligation on the new Assembly in the conduct of Assembly proceedings to give effect to the principle of treating the two languages on the basis of equality. But no reference is made to guidelines under the 1993 Act or to Standing Orders being produced in both languages. Clause 31, which deals entirely with Standing Orders, states that the Clerk must publish them from time to time, but no reference is made to languages.
	So there are many questions for the Government to answer about the differences between the old Section 47, which did provide protection for the language, and the lesser requirements and softer regime of new Clause 35, which links equality of language treatment with the totally different issue of equality of opportunity for all. Incidentally, equality of opportunity features among those special subjects like sustainable development that require Welsh Ministers to "pay special attention" to them. They have special clauses devoted to them, but no special clause is devoted to the protection of the Welsh language.
	The main purpose of the noble Lord's new clause is to elevate the language, and especially Ministers' treatment of it, to what I understand is the special status accorded to the matters highlighted in the category of clauses grouped under the description,
	"'Inclusive' approach to exercise of functions".
	What could be more deserving of such an approach than the Welsh language? The noble Lord expressed his concerns at Second Reading,
	"that the Bill does not place a duty on the Executive to promote the Welsh language in the governance of Wales".—[Official Report, 22/3/06; col. 295.]
	I shall go further and express my deep disappointment that the Bill seems to seize every conceivable opportunity to exonerate the Welsh Government in advance for any failure to discharge their responsibilities towards the language, hedged as they are with defensive qualifications like "appropriateness" and "practicality".
	My amendments seek to cast down the hedges erected by the Government and deprive the Executive of such facile opportunities to avoid their responsibilities. I certainly support the thrust of the noble Lord's new clause. Indeed, I shall seek to improve it if I can by the Report stage. I beg to move.

Lord Prys-Davies: I rise to speak in support of Amendment No. 53 in this group. I agree with almost every word uttered by the noble Lord, Lord Roberts of Conwy. He is an immense authority on the modern legal status of the Welsh language, he being the author of the expression, "treating both languages on the grounds of equality". The amendment addresses itself to the two significant issues which I raised at Second Reading. They are, first, the omission from the Bill of a duty by Welsh Ministers to treat the Welsh language on a basis of equality with the English language, and secondly, the equally significant omission of a duty on Ministers to promote and facilitate the use of the Welsh language in the good governance of Wales. The immediate effect of the first omission is significantly to weaken the present statutory infrastructure for the support of the Welsh language, which was created by the Welsh Language Act 1993 and the Government of Wales Act 1998. It is a backward step and therefore thoroughly unsatisfactory. The second omission denies the Welsh language the statutory support that the Government readily make available to other key areas of governance in Wales. Thus in Clause 73, Welsh Ministers are under a statutory duty,
	"to sustain and promote [Welsh] local government".
	Clause 74 creates a duty to promote the voluntary sector, and Clause 75,
	"to take account of the interests of business".
	Clause 78 imposes a duty,
	"to promote sustainable development".
	The Welsh language is also a vital element in the good governance of Wales. Its history goes back well beyond Magna Carta. It goes back to the creation of the Welsh nation itself. It is a part of the Welsh nation and can be said to be a part of the culture of Britain, yet a duty to support it is totally missing from the Bill. I suggest that a duty to support it is just as relevant, if not more relevant, if the language is to enjoy a realistic prospect of survival by the end of this century.
	I have a feeling, from what Ministers have said to me previously, that my noble friend on the Front Bench will once again not be reluctant to tell the Committee that the Assembly Government have consistently supported the Welsh language and they propose to adhere to that policy. But in reply, I cannot avoid saying, with deepest respect to my noble friend, that that would be a totally irrelevant argument, because the policy may change in the future, either due to a change of personalities or to a change of government. The fact remains that under the present Bill the Government are given a free hand to decide whether to promote the language. Can we accept that as right? I shall turn very briefly to the amendment. Subsection (1) is in line with Clause 73, relating to local government, or Clause 74 relating to the voluntary sector, or again to Clause78 relating to sustainable development. Subsection (1) refers to a "plan" instead of a scheme, but that is merely in order to avoid confusion with a Welsh language scheme.
	Subsection (2) is parallel to the duty of the legislature contained in Clause 35 and in Section 47 of the 1998 Act to which the noble Lord, Lord Roberts of Conwy, referred. Subsections (3) to (5) relate to reporting on the implementation of the plan and the scheme and an assessment of its effectiveness. They are not new. They are based on Clauses 77 and 78, being "Equality of opportunity" and "Sustainable development" respectively. I believe that the amendment will go some way in providing the statutory infrastructure for the Welsh language in the governance of Wales. Primary legislation will also be required to reform the substantial law itself, but that is for another day.
	I should add that the Welsh Language Board, which is the Government's own advisory body on the interests of the Welsh language and its members are appointed by the Government, has agreed the wording of the amendment. I hope that the Members of the Committee will be able to support the amendment and that my noble friend Lord Evans on the Front Bench can be persuaded that the Government should think again about the merits of what is being proposed in the amendment.

Lord Roberts of Llandudno: We would of course give wholehearted support to the amendment proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Prys-Davies. At the same time, I pay tribute to the noble Lord, Lord Roberts of Conwy, for all that he has done over the years when in office in support of the Welsh language. It has been seen in the revitalising of Welsh throughout Wales. The census in 2001 was the first for many years to show that more people than before were able to speak and write in Welsh. We thank all who contributed so substantially to that for what they have done: S4C—the independent television channel—and the Welsh language schools. We understand that, in the reorganisation of schools in Cardiff, the one shortage is of Welsh language education and that we are to be provided with more Welsh-medium schools in Cardiff. Substantial progress has been made, and so we pay tribute to all who have contributed towards that.
	I am sad to see the demise of Welsh Language Board, Bwrdd yr Iaith Gymraeg. It was an organisation that did a tremendous amount for the support of Welsh and the promotion of the Welsh language in Wales. It was an organisation—quango or not—that was at arm's length from the Assembly Government and because of that independence at least it was able to act in a way that was at times not entirely supportive of the views of the Assembly Government. We should pay tribute to work done by the Welsh Language Board, and possibly it would be worthwhile to save it at the last moment.
	We see in the present Welsh Assembly Government a lack of dynamism and commitment towards the expansion of Welsh. I hope that we have not come to the end of one type of progress where we are taking backwards steps rather than forward steps as the noble Lord, Lord Prys-Davies, said. When we had co-operation in Cardiff and the two parties working together, the work of Mrs Jenny Randerson as the Minister involved deserved a great deal of appreciation. We seem to have lost policies such as the Welsh language action areas, which were instigated then and which could have done so much more to further the cause of Welsh. If we support the amendments tabled by the three parties and the amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord Prys-Davies, I am sure that we can go forward with far more confidence that we have at present. It is our great pleasure to support the amendment.

Lord Crickhowell: I warmly support the amendments tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Prys-Davies, and my noble friend Lord Roberts of Conwy, and echo what has just been said by the noble Lord, Lord Roberts of Llandudno, about the Welsh Language Board. I share his doubts, as I said earlier, about it being absorbed within the Assembly, and this is a good example of why I have those doubts. I have a letter in front of me from the chairman of the board, urging us to support the language and giving reasons why we should do so. I wonder whether, if the circumstances were different and we were a little further down the road and debating the situation without the Welsh Language Board, we would have that independent voice making the demands that it reasonably makes for the changes.
	I, too, pay tribute to the Welsh Language Board for its work under successive chairman since we set it up. Incidentally, the chairmen appointed in some cases by my noble friend Lord Roberts of Conwy and Conservative Secretaries of State could by no means be described as Conservatives. We appointed those whom we thought could make the best contribution to the future of the Welsh language, and we should express a debt of gratitude to the distinguished chairmen who have served and to the members of the Welsh Language Board during its existence.